The Technology of Creditor Protection by Adler, Barry E. & Kahan, Marcel
  
  
(1773) 
UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA 
LAW REVIEW 
Founded 1852 
Formerly 
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
© 2013 by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
VOL. 161 JUNE 2013 NO. 7 
ARTICLE 
THE TECHNOLOGY OF CREDITOR PROTECTION 
BARRY E. ADLER† & MARCEL KAHAN†† 
Contract is the primary means through which creditors control a firm’s debt–
equity conflict. There is an irony here, however. Actions that may render a debtor 
insolvent are the events against which creditors contract. Yet when a breach of 
contract yields a debtor’s insolvency, the debtor cannot fully satisfy its creditors. 
Thus, a general creditor’s contractual remedy against a debtor cannot be fully 
effective, and anticipation of this shortcoming may increase a debtor’s cost of 
capital. A solution to this conundrum, proposed here, would permit creditors and 
debtors to contract for creditor remedies against third parties—other creditors, 
shareholders, and corporate affiliates—who may have benefitted from a debtor’s 
breach, provided that the creditor gave actual or constructive notice of its right to 
seek such remedies. This solution would offer creditors protection akin to that now 
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afforded contractually through secured credit and now afforded by legal rule through 
the laws of voidable preference and fraudulent conveyance. Because the proposed 
protection would be contractually based, it could be tailored to the needs of individual 
firms and could thus improve, and to some extent obviate the need for, the protec-
tions now provided by law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Almost four decades ago, Michael Jensen and William Meckling wrote 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
which sets out to combine “elements from the theory of agency, the theory 
of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the 
ownership structure of the firm.”1 They focused on dueling conflicts among 
a firm’s constituents: on the one hand, conflict between a firm’s investors 
and its managers; and on the other, conflict between a firm’s debtholders 
and its shareholders. Debt itself serves as a tool to control the investor–
manager conflict but also generates a new conflict, between shareholders and 
creditors. Whenever ownership and control are separated, agency costs cannot 
be wholly eliminated, but they can be minimized. Since the publication of 
 
1 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (1976). 
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Jensen and Meckling’s seminal article, there has been an evolution in the 
theory of how to accomplish such minimization. 
As one of us has argued in earlier work,2 the agency costs between a 
firm’s shareholders and its managers have recently declined. Reasons for the 
decline include the greater use of incentive compensation, the growth and 
increased activism of institutional shareholders, the rise of hedge funds, 
regulatory changes, and the increased independence of outside directors.3 
Where debt persists despite the reduction in equity agency costs, such 
reduction increases the relative importance of the relationship between a 
firm’s creditors and its managers, a relationship that encompasses the 
conflict between a firm’s creditors and its shareholders to the extent that 
managers represent shareholders.4  
As we discuss below, financial creditors rely principally on contracts to 
protect their interests, though legally supplied rights offer some additional 
protections. We generally favor this reliance on contractual rights and, with 
one important exception, we are skeptical about the need and desirability of 
additional legal protections for financial creditors. The exception, and this 
Article’s central theme, is this: where a creditor does achieve contractual 
protection against exploitation, the terms of such protection should, subject 
to some limits, be enforceable against third parties.  
By endorsing contractual remedies that run against third parties—those 
who are not parties to the contract at issue—our proposal is conceptually 
related to the literature on property rights.5 Like the remedies we are 
 
2 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1051 (2010) 
(tracing the reduction of shareholder–manager agency costs as power “has shifted notably in the 
last decade away from CEOs towards outside directors and shareholders”). 
3 See id. at 995-1037; see also Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Gov-
ernance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1029-42 (2007) (discussing hedge fund 
activism); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: 
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 896-97 (2002) (discussing the rise of 
incentive compensation and independent directors as adaptive responses to Delaware hostile 
takeover law). 
4 See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1907, 1928 (2013) (“[I]ncreasing the alignment of managers and shareholders can have a significant 
effect on bondholders.”). 
5 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S378 (2002) 
(“[T]he attribute that distinguishes a property right from a contract right is that a property right is 
enforceable, not just against the original grantor of the right, but also against other persons . . . .”); 
Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1178 n.73 (1999) 
(discussing whether a trust grants a property or contract right); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE 
L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (distinguishing property and contract rights). 
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proposing, property rights do not require the assent of all those against 
whom such rights are asserted.  
The legal reform recommended here expands and elaborates on a sug-
gestion made by one of us that a firm’s public pledge to abjure debt should 
be enforceable against subsequent creditors that obtain an interest in violation 
of such pledge.6 In this Article, we apply the intuition behind this proposal 
to a wider set of contractual terms; we also root the proposal in a more 
general theory of contract and property rights and integrate it into a theory 
of agency cost and firm ownership.  
I. TYPOLOGY OF CREDITOR PROTECTION 
In examining the regime of creditor protection, one can distinguish 
types of creditor protection along two dimensions. The first dimension 
relates to the person in whom incentives are imbued or against whom 
remedies are imposed. The second dimension relates to the source and 
scope of these incentives and remedies. 
Regarding the person, most basically, it is the debtor that can be moti-
vated or obligated to perform. When a debtor incurs an obligation, it has 
reputational and other incentives to fulfill that obligation. And if these 
incentives are insufficient, the debtor’s legal obligation means that a creditor 
may enforce compliance to the extent the debtor is able to comply. These 
incentives do not always ensure that a debtor will perform on all of its 
promises. For example, the Argentine Republic has refused to pay some of 
its sovereign debt obligations while it continues to pay others. Its incentive 
to repay proved insufficient and, against sovereign debtors, a party’s means 
of enforcement are limited.7 Nevertheless, a creditor’s reliance on perfor-
mance by or recovery from a debtor is central to creditor protection. 
In addition to the debtor itself, incentives can be instilled in—or reme-
dies imposed on—a number of other persons: subsidiaries of the debtor, 
shareholders of the debtor as well as entities owned by these shareholders, 
directors and officers of the debtor, and certain other creditors of the 
 
6 See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Financial and Political Theories]; see also Barry E. 
Adler, Secured Credit Contracts [hereinafter Adler, Secured Credit] (describing potential efficiency 
benefits of negative pledges), in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW 405, 408 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: 
Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 347 (1999) (seeking 
“to strengthen negative pledge covenants by making them enforceable against subsequent secured 
creditors”). 
7 See Argentina’s Debt Default: Gauchos and Gadflies, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, at 91 (reviewing 
creditors’ difficulties collecting on Argentinian debt). 
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debtor.8 These other persons can be influenced in their individual capaci-
ties, and not just as persons that have an interest in or control over the 
debtor. Examples of devices bearing on these other persons are parent and 
subsidiary guarantees, which make the guarantor liable for the debt of the 
principal obligor; the doctrine of veil piercing, which can make a shareholder 
liable for the debts of a company she controls; and the bankruptcy provi-
sions governing preferences and equitable subordination, which provide for 
the return of certain payments made to creditors and the subordination of 
certain debts, respectively, in each case for the benefit of other creditors. 
These devices can serve a creditor’s interest by helping deter a breach of 
contract in the first place (such as where a guarantor in control of a debtor 
induces the debtor to repay rather than default on a loan) or by compensating 
a creditor after a breach (such as where the guarantor pays after a debtor’s 
default).  
The second dimension of creditor protection, regarding the source and 
scope of incentives and remedies, can be provided through two mechanisms: 
legal rules and contracts with creditors. Legal rules that provide incentives 
and remedies include, in addition to those mentioned above, rules on 
fraudulent conveyance law and lender liability as well as legal capital rules 
and fiduciary duties to creditors. Contractually supplied incentives and 
remedies include, among other provisions typically found in debt agree-
ments, provisions on maturity and default interest, financial ratio covenants, 
restrictions on the issuance of additional or secured debt, restrictions on the 
payment of dividends, change of control provisions, and agreements to 
subordinate some debts to other debts.9 
It is worth noting that these creditor-protection incentives and remedies 
operate against a background of other fundamental structures. Of these, 
first and foremost is the shareholders’ economic interest in the firm. Such 
interest engenders in the shareholders an incentive to create firm value and 
to provide corresponding incentives for officers and directors to create such 
value. Although the interests of shareholders and those of creditors sometimes 
conflict, and while such conflict is the subject of our discussion below, it is 
 
8 This list is not exhaustive. Any purchaser from a debtor might be influenced, for example, 
by potential liability under fraudulent conveyance laws, discussed infra Section III.B. We limit our 
discussion, though, to the individuals and entities we perceive as the most relevant to our analysis.  
9 For an overview of contractual provisions found in public debt and private placements, see, 
for example, Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Private Versus Public Lending: Evidence from 
Covenants, in THE YEARBOOK OF FIXED INCOME INVESTING 1995, at 253, 253-74 ( John D. 
Finnerty & Martin S. Fridson eds., 1995). For sample covenants in debt contracts, see Comm. on 
Trust Indentures & Indenture Trs., ABA Section of Business Law, Model Negotiated Covenants and 
Related Definitions, 61 BUS. LAW. 1439, 1500-35 (2006).  
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important not to forget that shareholder and creditor interests are broadly 
aligned with respect to a wide set of decisions: both shareholders and 
creditors want the company to be well run and profitable. 
In the United States, contractual provisions are the most significant 
component of the creditor-protection regime. These are supplemented by 
the legal rules identified above and, in some cases, described more fully 
below.  
II. THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF CONTRACTUAL  
CREDITOR PROTECTION 
In our view, it is sensible that creditors in the United States rely on con-
tracts instead of legal rules for protection. Contractual protections have 
some general advantages over legal rules. Contracts afford the parties the 
ability to determine for themselves the terms that will govern their relation-
ship and enable different debtors and different creditors to agree on 
different terms. Moreover, contracts can be changed more easily than laws 
as circumstances change. This is especially true for contracts with finite 
duration, such as contracts with creditors. Even if these contracts cannot be 
easily amended, they expire at some point, and debtors and creditors enter 
into new contracts to govern their relationship.10  
These arguments are especially forceful in the context of the relation-
ship between a company and its financial creditors. Financial creditors 
include mostly banks, private-placement lenders, and bondholders. These 
creditors are predominantly financial institutions in the business of lending 
money or holding debt securities.11 They tend to be large, sophisticated, and 
repeat players. Loan agreements between firms and financial creditors are 
often lengthy and contain detailed provisions designed to protect the 
interests of creditors.12 In short, financial creditors are the kinds of parties 
that can easily look out for their own interests.13 
 
10 As Mike Klausner and one of us have noted elsewhere, legal rules may generate network 
externalities. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 725-27 (1997). But boilerplate 
contract terms generate similar externalities; in any case, network externalities generally do not 
justify mandatory legal rules. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of 
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 834-37 (1995) (“The presence of network externalities offers a slim 
basis for the use of mandatory rules in corporate law.”). 
11 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS THIRD QUARTER 2012, at 100 
tbl.L.212 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20121206/z1.pdf (showing 
holdings of corporate and foreign bonds by type of holder). 
12 Although we use the term “loan agreements” generically, contracts between debtors and 
banks are usually called credit agreements; contracts related to publicly issued corporate bonds are 
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Of course, not all creditors of a company fall into this category. Some 
creditors are involuntary and thus have no ability to protect themselves by 
contract. Others are small, unsophisticated, or short-term creditors for 
which negotiating detailed protections may make little sense. We discuss in 
Section IV.C how these groups of creditors could be handled. At this point, 
though, it is sufficient to say that these groups generally do not account for 
the bulk of corporate liabilities.14 
Even for financial creditors, the benefits of contractual protections are 
limited. Such protections may not generate significant incentives for—and 
do not necessarily impose liability on—persons other than the debtor. 
Under current law these other persons typically are not liable unless they 
are parties to the contract. This privity, of course, is not uncommon. In 
particular, we observe contractual guarantees by corporate affiliates of a 
debtor—such as a parent or subsidiary—for the debtor’s obligations. We 
also observe contractual subordination provisions where one set of creditors 
agrees to have its claims subordinated to those of another set of creditors,15 
and we observe intercreditor agreements among secured creditors. But 
while it may often be feasible to bind existing affiliates and creditors 
through such contracts, it is much harder to bind future ones.16 
This limitation matters. Monetary contractual liability is only as good as 
the breaching party’s ability to pay. Whenever one enters into a contract 
with another party, it is possible that the other party will both breach the 
contract and become insolvent and thus will not be able to pay damages. For 
most contracts, breach and inability to pay are distinct events that may be 
unrelated. Take, for example, a contract for the sale of goods: the seller may 
fail to deliver the goods as promised, and thus breach the contract, but be 
able to pay damages. Of course, it is also possible that the supplier both 
breaches the contract and is insolvent. However, unless the contract consti-
tutes a large part of the supplier’s business, these two contingencies may not 
be closely connected. By contrast, it is in the nature of a loan covenant that 
 
typically called indentures; and contracts governing privately placed debt are generally called note 
purchase agreements. 
13 See generally Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. 
U. L. REV. 565 (1995). 
14 See BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 11, at 70 tbl.L.102 (showing that credit market instru-
ments account for about 60% of total liabilities; foreign direct investment in United States for 
about 17%; trade debt for about 14%; and taxes and pension obligations for less than 1% each).  
15 The senior creditors are generally third-party beneficiaries to the subordination contract. 
16 To be sure, loan agreements often obligate the debtor to, inter alia, obtain guarantees from 
future subsidiaries. But until such guarantees are executed, future subsidiaries are not contractually 
liable.  
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there is typically a tight relationship between breach of a loan agreement 
and a debtor’s insolvency.  
Unlike a run-of-the-mill contractual obligor, which may breach inadvert-
ently or because it is efficient to do so and then pay damages in full, the 
typical debtor that breaches—that is, fails to pay—does so simply because it 
lacks the resources to perform. Put simply, when the obligation is the 
payment of cash, a merely inadvertent breach can be corrected by payment, 
and the notion of efficient breach is generally inapposite. Breach of a money 
obligation typically implies a lack of cash, which impairs any nominal 
damages remedy. 
To address the inadequacy of damages, loan agreements often include 
additional provisions—so-called covenants—that are designed either to 
deter the debtor from taking actions that increase the risk of default or to 
provide an early warning signal to creditors of an incipient insolvency so 
that they may seek repayment while the company is still (if only barely) 
solvent. Such covenants include, among others, limitations on the company’s 
indebtedness, restrictions on dividends and share repurchases, restrictions 
on the incurrence of debt or of secured debt, requirements that asset sale 
proceeds be used to repay debt, and net worth requirements.17 Violation of 
these covenants generally triggers a right of creditors to accelerate, that is, 
to seek immediate repayment of the amount owed to them.18 
This structure poses a peculiar problem for financial creditors. If, as a 
result of a covenant violation (or after the violation and prior to the 
enforcement of any acceleration), the company has already become insol-
vent, the acceleration remedy may not be fully effective. Covenants, there-
fore, must be set more tightly and must be monitored more intensely than 
would be necessary were creditors to have an effective remedy for breach 
regardless of solvency. And sometimes even tighter triggers and extensive 
monitoring will be insufficient to provide a pre-insolvency remedy. The 
costs of tighter covenants, increased monitoring, and the residual risk of 
nonrepayment are ultimately borne by debtors, whether in the form of 
reduced flexibility, increased risk of acceleration, higher interest rates, or 
reduced availability of credit.  
 
17 See, e.g., Kahan & Tuckman, supra note 9, at 253-74 (presenting an overview of covenants in 
public and private debt). 
18 See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comm. for Revision of the 1983 Model Simplified Indenture et al., Am. 
Bar Ass’n, Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 BUS. LAW. 1115, 1136-37 (2000) (providing for the 
acceleration remedy). Bondholders also have other remedies. See id. at 1137 (providing for the 
pursuit of “any available remedy”). But damage remedies are rarely pursued because it is difficult 
to prove and quantify damages from a covenant violation.  
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The link between debtor breach and insolvency, together with the diffi-
culty of contracting with persons other than the debtor, suggest there could 
be benefits from a legal rule that permitted a debtor and its creditors to 
create contract obligations enforceable against third parties. The obligations 
we have in mind could be imposed on third parties who engaged in or 
benefitted from violations of a loan agreement. In Part IV, we discuss such a 
rule in greater detail. But next we discuss more fully the rationales for 
remedies against third parties, and we address, but largely reject, other 
additional remedies imposed by law and not by contract. 
III. REMEDIES AGAINST THIRD PARTIES 
 In principle, the argument for remedies against a non (third) party to a 
contract can be based on one of two rationales. The first rationale, the 
control rationale, is that the third party (or the third party’s agent) has some 
control over whether certain actions take place and that imposing liability 
will improve the third party’s (or its agent’s) incentives with respect to such 
actions. In addition to the guarantor illustration provided above, a classic 
example is the securities laws’ imposition of liability on underwriters for 
false statements made by the company in a registration statement. The 
second rationale, the improper benefit rationale, is that the third party 
derived some undue benefit from an action at the expense of others. The 
undue benefit rationale is, in part, merely an ex post aspect of the control 
rationale, relevant when an illicit action occurs despite the disincentive 
created by the remedy. There is more to the rationale, however. A third 
party may receive an undue benefit as a result of an action over which it has 
no control. As an example, consider a sole shareholder who causes an 
insolvent company to make a gift to his children. Such a gift could be 
recovered by the company as a fraudulent conveyance regardless of whether 
the children were in any way at fault. 
To the extent that it is desirable to impose remedies against third parties 
to a credit contract, how should such remedies be designed? As we discussed 
in Part I, remedies running against third parties could be imposed on 
directors or officers, on shareholders (controlling or other), or on other 
creditors. As we explain below, we do not believe that the expansion of 
remedies against directors and officers would provide a net benefit, though 
we would have no objection to such remedies if rooted in contract. As we 
also explain, we find current legal remedies against shareholders and 
creditors adequate but favor laws that would permit a contractual expansion 
(and, for that matter, contraction) of such remedies.  
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A. Remedies Against Directors and Officers 
Remedies against directors as third parties could, in principle, fit primari-
ly under the control rationale, though a remedy to address self-dealing 
would come under the improper benefit rationale as well. Directors have the 
right to manage the affairs of the corporation. As such, they have significant 
control over corporate actions.  
The problem with director liability to creditors, however, is that such 
liability would be unlikely to improve directors’ overall incentives. In 
publicly held companies with dispersed shareholdings, directors may derive 
only small personal benefits from most managerial decisions, including 
decisions that benefit shareholders at the expense of creditors. The prospect 
of personal liability to creditors for such decisions would thus act as a perhaps 
excessively strong deterrent. Similar reasons caution against imposing 
liability on officers. 
To elaborate, when the law is clear and penalizes directors only for 
actions that reduce overall firm value, strong deterrence is desirable, but 
problems arise if the law is overbroad, unpredictable, or ambiguous. In 
those cases, the prospect of personal liability would tend to make directors 
excessively cautious. Why, after all, should directors risk the chance, however 
small, of personal liability to creditors by, for example, delaying a bankruptcy 
filing, declaring a dividend, or approving a leveraged buyout? Such excessive 
caution could result in two types of costs. First, directors could induce 
companies to expend excessive corporate resources on professional advice. 
Such advice would include legal opinions on the directors’ obligations as 
well as expert financial or accounting advice, such as solvency and fairness 
opinions. Second, directors could become highly conservative and refuse to 
take actions that would increase overall firm value unless, given the advice 
obtained, it were clear that they faced little or no risk of personal liability.19  
Importantly, the imposition of liability to creditors for excessive risk-
taking would skew incentives if, as under current law, directors faced no 
equivalent risk of personal liability to shareholders for excessive caution. 
Several features of corporate law now insulate directors from liability to 
shareholders if they run corporations conservatively. First, under the 
business judgment rule, a court will not second-guess a board judgment if 
the board was informed, independent, disinterested, and acted in good 
faith.20 In Delaware, the most important jurisdiction for publicly traded 
 
19 See generally Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439 
(1992) (collecting early sources). 
20 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
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companies,21 provisions such as sections 141(e)22 and 17223 of the General 
Corporation Law protect directors if they rely in good faith on the records 
of the corporation or on reports prepared by officers and other professionals. 
Moreover, section 102(b)(7) permits companies to eliminate personal liability 
of directors unless they derive an improper personal benefit, breach their 
fiduciary duty of loyalty, or act in bad faith,24 an option exercised by almost 
every publicly traded Delaware company.25 Finally, directors have great 
leeway to have the corporation obtain professional advice. Consequently, if 
faced with broad liability to creditors, directors would have both the incen-
tives and the ability to run the firm in an excessively cautious manner, and 
thereby minimize the threat of personal liability, whether to creditors or 
shareholders. And, as far as we know, no one has proposed that such incen-
tive be addressed through the punishment of caution, which could create its 
own perverse incentives.26 
Consistent with this normative analysis, legal rights against directors are 
not a significant component of the creditor protection regime in the United 
States. Two doctrinal strands in Delaware’s corporation law address creditor 
protection: fiduciary duty law and statutory provisions on capital. But as we 
next explain, these doctrines afford limited substantive protection and 
impose no material risk of monetary liability unless the directors misbehave 
egregiously.  
Regarding the first sort of legally imposed creditor protection, under 
Delaware law, directors owe a notional fiduciary duty to creditors if the 
corporation is insolvent.27  Practically, however, this merely means that 
 
21 For data that describe the predominance of Delaware incorporations, see, for example, 
Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1571 (2002). 
Although our discussion in this Part focuses on Delaware law, the general principles we describe 
are common to other jurisdictions.  
22 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2011). 
23 Id. § 172. 
24 Id. § 102(b)(7). 
25 See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 
EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160 (1990) (noting that over 90% of Delaware companies adopted a provision 
limiting liability within one year after the statute permitting such provisions was enacted). 
26 One might imagine a restoration of balance if, along with the broad imposition of liability 
to creditors for excessive risk, the law imposed on directors liability to shareholders for excessive 
caution. But the likely result would be directors paralyzed by fear of action or inaction, and a 
reluctance to serve at all. 
27 See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 
2007); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) (“[W]hen the insolvency 
exception [to the general rule that directors do not owe creditors duties beyond the relevant 
contractual terms] does arise, it creates fiduciary duties for directors for the benefit of creditors.”). 
The Delaware Supreme Court has recently clarified that these duties arise only upon insolvency, 
and not earlier when the corporation enters a zone of insolvency. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101. In an 
 
  
1784 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1773 
 
creditors obtain standing to assert breaches of fiduciary duties in a deriva-
tive action.28 Directors of insolvent corporations enjoy the protections of 
the business judgment rule and of any exculpatory provisions under section 
102(b)(7) to the same extent as directors of solvent corporations in a share-
holder derivative action.29 Thus, directors are largely insulated from the 
threat of personal liability unless they self-deal or intentionally violate their 
duties, and a claim that directors chose an unduly risky course for the 
benefit of shareholders would not likely cross this line. 30  Importantly, 
 
earlier case, the Delaware Chancery Court had suggested that even in the zone of insolvency, a 
board may take actions that benefit creditors at the expense of shareholders. See Credit Lyonnais 
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commcn’s Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1155-57 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“[W]here a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board 
of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate 
enterprise.”).  
28 See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101-02; Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 
772, 792 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[W]hen a director of an insolvent corporation, through a breach of 
fiduciary duty, injures the firm itself, the claim against the director is still one belonging to the 
corporation.”), overruled in part by Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92. Thus, creditors can, for instance, pursue 
a claim based on self-dealing in breach of a duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Shandler v. DLJ Merch. 
Banking, Inc., C.A. No. 4797-VCS, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 154, at *41-42 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2010). 
29 See Shandler, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 154, at *56; Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 792, 794 (“The kind 
of claims that an insolvent firm could press against its directors would, one would think, be at most 
coextensive with, and certainly not superior to, the claims that a solvent firm itself could bring 
against its directors.”). 
30 The duties that directors of an insolvent firm owe to creditors may resemble the duties 
that directors of any corporation owe to preferred shareholders. While preferred shareholders have 
standing to assert derivatively rights shared equally with common shareholders, they generally 
cannot challenge a board’s decision to further the interests of common shareholders at the expense 
of preferred shareholders. See HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., Civ. A. No. 12922, 1993 
WL 257422, at *772 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1993); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 
593-95 (Del. Ch. 1986); see generally RGC Int’l Investors, LDC v. Greka Energy Corp., C.A. No. 
17674, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 157, at *54 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 2000) (“[D]irectors do not owe preferred 
stockholders the broad fiduciary duties belonging to common stockholders.”).  
Thus, in Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997), the court found 
that a company unable to satisfy its liquidation preferences did not violate its duty to preferred 
shareholders when, rather than liquidate, it raised additional debt that gave it more time to 
continue development of promising technologies with an upside potential gain that would accrue 
to the common shareholders. Id. at 1041, 1053. The court concluded that the board did not violate 
its fiduciary duties by acting in this manner to advance the interest of the common shareholders at 
the expense of the preferred shareholders. Id. at 1058-59; see also Quadrangle Offshore (Cayman) 
LLC v. Kenetech Corp., C.A. No. 16362, 1999 Del Ch. LEXIS 213, at *24 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1999) 
(finding that a board’s action to retain value for common shareholders by persuading noteholders 
not to place company in bankruptcy and thereby trigger liquidation preference of preferred 
shareholders was not a breach of duty), aff ’d, 751 A.2d 878 (Del. 2000). Under Delaware law, we do 
not believe creditors in a case such as Equity-Linked Investors would have greater rights than those 
afforded to preferred shareholders. By the same token, we also do not believe that the directors in 
that case would have faced liability if the board had decided to liquidate rather than raise debt and 
buy additional time. See infra text accompanying note 32. 
  
2013] Technology of Creditor Protection 1785 
 
creditors may not press any direct claims against directors (based on a 
theory that a board decision harmed some or all creditors directly, as 
opposed to a board decision that harmed the corporation, and harmed 
creditors only indirectly).31 Fiduciary duties to creditors thus are principally 
a shield to insulate directors from shareholder claims that the board subor-
dinated shareholder interests to those of creditors; such duties are less a 
sword held by creditors who want to force the board to take actions that 
benefit creditors at the shareholders’ expense.32  
The second strand of legally imposed creditor protection is based on 
legal capital rules that restrict dividends and share repurchases. Under these 
rules, a corporation may pay dividends only out of surplus—defined under 
Delaware law as total assets less total liabilities less legal capital33—or out 
of the net profits of the current or the preceding fiscal year.34 Similar 
restrictions apply to share repurchases.35 Directors are personally liable for 
negligent or willful violations of these rules.36 That said, although violations 
of these provisions are neither protected by the business judgment rule nor 
exculpated by section 102(b)(7), as a source of director liability, they lack 
bite. The limit on dividends and share repurchases is extremely lax and 
significantly less restrictive than limitations commonly found in loan 
agreements.37 Moreover, directors face no prospect of liability as long as 
they rely in good faith upon the records of the corporation, upon any infor-
mation or reports of its employees, or upon the advice of professionals.38 The 
combination of the lax substantive standard and this safe harbor means that 
 
31 See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 103 (“Accordingly, we hold that individual creditors of an insol-
vent corporation have no right to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against corporate 
directors.”). 
32 See Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 788 (discussing Credit Lyonnais); see also Blackmore Partners, 
L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, C.A. No. 454-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 155, at *23 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 
2005) (granting motion for summary judgment because company was insolvent and board was 
permitted “to take into account the interests of creditors at the apparent expense of stockholders”). 
33 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (2011). 
34 Id. § 170. 
35 Id. § 160(a). 
36 Id. § 174. 
37 See Kahan & Tuckman, supra note 9, at 260 (showing that dividend covenants typically 
limit dividends to a fraction of earnings and require retention of the initial reservoir). Moreover, 
under legal capital requirements, companies are permitted to revalue assets to their current market 
value in determining the amount available for these payments, see Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug 
Centers, Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 154-55 (Del. 1997) (en banc), whereas loan agreements require that 
earnings be calculated based on generally accepted accounting practices or accounting rules 
specifically set forth in the agreement. 
38 Tit. 8, § 172.  
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the legal capital rules pose no significant liability risk for directors interested 
in serving shareholders even at the expense of creditors.39  
Delaware law, including the provision of potential liability to creditors, 
thus imposes little risk of personal liability unless directors personally benefit 
from wrongdoing.40 As suggested above, the reluctance of Delaware’s corpo-
rate law to impose liability on directors is an essential complement to their 
functional role.41 Most directors of publicly traded corporations are not full-
time employees, must rely on information provided to them by insiders, and 
own a relatively small equity stake. Even directors who are executives of the 
company, and are thus better informed with, perhaps, a larger equity share, 
 
39 It is possible that the legal capital rules in some states have a more significant impact on 
directors than those in Delaware. See Sattar A. Mansi et al., Creditor Protection Laws and the Cost of 
Debt, 52 J.L. & ECON. 701, 705, 713 (2009) (finding that non-Delaware firms from states with 
stricter legal capital rules have better credit ratings and significantly lower yield spreads than 
Delaware firms).  
40 Creditor rights against directors appear to be greater under the law of some jurisdictions 
outside the United States. Under English law, for example, a director faces liability if she “knew or 
ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that [her] company would avoid 
going into insolvent liquidation” unless, from that point on, she “took every step with a view to 
minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors.” Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214 
(U.K.). Similarly, under German law, the members of the management board (Vorstand) of a 
Stock Corporation are subject to liability if they do not file for bankruptcy once the company has 
become over-indebted (liabilities exceed assets) or unable to pay its debts. See Insolvenzordnung 
[InsO] [German Insolvency Act], Oct. 5, 1994, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] at 
2866, last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 20, 2011, BGBL. I at 2854, § 15(2) (Ger.), translated in 
GERMAN INSOLVENCY ACT: GERMAN-ENGLISH TEXT 40-41 ( Joachim Gres & Michael C. 
Frege trans., 2002) (creating an obligation to file); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] 
[CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, BGBL. I at 1600, as amended, § 823(2) (Ger.), translated in THE 
GERMAN CIVIL CODE: REVISED EDITION (AS AMENDED TO JANUARY 1, 1992) 153 (Simon 
L. Goren trans., 1994) (imposing civil liability for violations). Such liability extends both to 
persons who were already creditors when the duty to file arose and to persons who subsequently 
became creditors. See MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 823 
Rn. 397 (Ger.); see also Rock, supra note 4, at 1977-79 (reviewing U.K. and other law). While, based 
on this doctrinal description, directors seem subject to greater duties under U.K. or German law 
than under U.S. law, we are not sure whether, taking into account both the way these laws are 
interpreted and differences in the enforcement regime (e.g., lack of an active plaintiff ’s bar, 
differences in damage measures), directors of U.K. and German corporations are subject to a 
materially higher threat of personal liability than directors of U.S. corporations. 
41 Even assuming that broad creditor rights against directors and officers would be efficient, 
and thus, ex ante, benefit shareholders through a lower cost of capital, ex post, a legally imposed 
expansion of creditors’ rights would favor creditors over shareholders and directors. Consequently, 
such expansion would bestow a windfall benefit on creditors in the large stock of existing Delaware 
incorporations at the expense of shareholders. Both the directors and shareholders of these 
corporations might therefore benefit from reincorporating the firm in a different state (one that 
grants fewer rights to creditors), and creditors may be unable to stop a reincorporation. Conse-
quently, an expansion of creditors’ rights under state corporate law would not only be of question-
able merit, but, unless enforced uniformly across jurisdictions, would also be of questionable 
efficacy. 
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would be reluctant to risk their personal wealth in service of a limited 
investment in the company. Delaware judges and lawmakers apparently 
realize that the prospect of personal liability—whether to shareholders or 
creditors—would make directors excessively cautious if liability attached to 
activities less flagrant, or less clearly proscribed, than unauthorized self-
dealing.42 Significantly, investors also take this view: loan agreements give 
no indication that companies and creditors would want to impose liability 
on directors.43 
For these reasons, we are skeptical about a legally imposed expansion of 
creditor remedies against directors.44 And although our analysis here has 
 
42 There are cases in which directors faced a significant prospect of monetary liability despite 
the absence of a wrongful personal benefit. The best known of these cases is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858, 863-64 (Del. 1985). There are even instances of such cases after the adoption of 
section 102(b)(7), a director-protection provision prompted by Van Gorkom. See, e.g., Ryan v. 
Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 357-58 (Del. Ch. 2007) (finding that directors who approved the backdating 
of stock options may face liability regardless of whether they received backdated options); In re 
Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *39 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (refusing to exculpate outside director who did not act in good faith even though he did not 
directly benefit from unfair transaction). These cases, however, represent exceptions that prove the 
rule. As noted, Van Gorkom was effectively overturned by legislation; Ryan involved egregious facts 
and quasi-criminal conduct; and Emerging Communications exhibited an erroneous litigation 
strategy and pertained to a board member who benefited monetarily from his association with a 
controlling shareholder who did obtain a direct wrongful benefit. In other cases that presented the 
prospect of a director’s personal liability despite the absence of self-enrichment, no such liability 
was ultimately imposed. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. 
Ch. 2003) (refusing to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty action against board members who did not 
personally benefit from alleged breach); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 60-
62, 73 (Del. Ch. 2006) (finding that directors did not breach duties). But see Rock, supra note 4, at 
subsection IV.A.2 (presenting arguments for how Delaware doctrines could be interpreted to 
create a more severe risk of liability for directors).  
43 Loan agreements and associated documents sometimes include remedies against the debtor’s 
shareholders, subsidiaries, and other creditors, each of whom contractually consent to such liability. 
Examples of such provisions include upstream guarantees, downstream guarantees, subordination 
clauses, and intercreditor agreements. But loan agreements do not contain equivalent provisions 
with respect to directors and officers. To the contrary, bond indentures regularly contain provi-
sions similar to the following:  
No director, officer, employee, incorporator, member, partner or stockholder of the 
Company or any Guarantor, as such, shall have any liability for any obligations of the 
Company or the Guarantors under the Securities, this Indenture, the Subsidiary 
Guarantees, any Registration Rights Agreement or for any claim based on, in respect 
of or by reason of such obligations or their creation. By accepting a Security, each 
Holder waives and releases all such liability. The waiver and release shall be part of 
the consideration for the issue of the Securities.  
Petrohawk Energy Corp., Indenture (Form 8-K), at exhibit 4.1, § 11.9 (Aug. 20, 2010). 
44 For commentators advocating expanded creditor rights against directors, see, for example, 
Albert H. Barkey, The Financial Articulation of a Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders with Fiduciary Duties 
to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 47, 68-69 (1986) (advocating a duty to 
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been largely confined to directors, the same reasoning makes us reluctant to 
endorse a legally imposed expansion of creditor remedies against officers.45 
B. Remedies Against Shareholders and Corporate Affiliates 
Noncontractual third-party remedies against shareholders or corporate 
affiliates could be justified either under the control rationale or the improper 
benefit rationale. At present, third-party remedies against shareholders or 
affiliates principally arise under the rubrics of piercing the corporate veil 
and fraudulent conveyance.46  
To pierce the corporate veil (and thus hold a shareholder liable for cor-
porate debts), generally, a creditor must show that the shareholder was in 
control of the corporation and sought benefit through fraud or some other 
wrong.47 By contrast, remedies for fraudulent conveyance against a shareholder 
 
maximize current market value of stocks and bonds and to compensate bondholders for any wealth 
appropriations); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 
449-50 (1986) (contending that directors’ “[f]iduciary duties to bondholders should implement the 
Pareto principle of welfare economics”); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. 
CORP. L. 205, 307-09 (1988) (suggesting a fiduciary duty to maximize firm value); Lawrence E. 
Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1224 (1990) (arguing 
for a director’s duty not to take any actions inconsistent with reasonable expectations of bondholders 
unless required by a legitimate business purpose that cannot otherwise be reasonably achieved); see 
also Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1869-72 (1992) (advocating for an enhanced duty of good faith); Martin 
Riger, The Trust Indenture as Bargained Contract: The Persistence of Myth, 16 J. CORP. L. 211, 243 
(1991) (calling for governmental intervention to strengthen bondholder rights generally). But see 
Kahan, supra note 13, at 616-17 (arguing that creditor protection should be based on contract). 
45 Officers presently face minimal risk of liability to shareholders unless they engage in un-
authorized transactions from which they derive a financial benefit at the expense of shareholders at 
large. To be sure, under Delaware law, officers owe fiduciary duties to shareholders. See Gantler v. 
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del. 2009) (holding that fiduciary duties of officers are the same as 
those of directors). Furthermore, unlike directors, officers cannot be exculpated from breaches of 
their fiduciary duty of care under section 102(b)(7). In principle, officers can thus be liable for 
decisions taken in their capacity as officers. But to establish a breach of duty of care against an 
officer, the plaintiff must show that the officer was uninformed, which is difficult in a case against 
corporate employees. Moreover, officers can be protected by a firm’s directors. Unless the board 
wishes to bring an action, a breach of fiduciary duty suit against an officer would be a derivative 
claim, and a shareholder-plaintiff cannot ordinarily pursue a derivative suit against officers 
(whether for breach of duty of care or of loyalty) because such an action would not satisfy the 
demand futility requirement. See Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1047-49 (3d Cir. 1992). 
46 If a firm is insolvent, creditors can also bring a derivative lawsuit against a controlling 
shareholder for self-dealing or similar breaches of fiduciary duties. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. 
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101-02 (Del. 2007). Shareholders may also 
be obligated to return a dividend paid in violation of the dividend restrictions imposed by 
corporate law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174(c) (2011). 
47 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 506-14 (2001) 
(describing the doctrine of veil piercing). 
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or affiliate are not explicitly premised on control of the corporation or on a 
wrongful act. 
In the shareholder context, the basis for these remedies against third 
parties is not merely that shareholders were unjustly, if innocently, enriched 
by a corporate action. Shareholders, in the aggregate, control the corpora-
tion. To be sure, in companies with dispersed shareholdings, no individual 
shareholder exercises control. And in companies with a controlling share-
holder, minority shareholders do not exercise control. Still, in order to 
reduce the agency costs of equity that result from the separation of owner-
ship and control, the corporate structure is set up to align the incentives of 
the corporate decisionmakers (directors and officers) with those of share-
holders. Shareholders thus elect directors, who owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporation and to shareholders, and officers receive incentive compensation 
designed to align their interests with those of shareholders. It is, therefore, 
not a coincidence when directors approve actions—such as an increase in 
leverage or payment of dividends—that benefit shareholders but harm 
creditors. Even though shareholders do not control the transaction—in fact, 
they may not have any direct say in the transaction—the directors act as 
their agents (in the economic sense) and for their benefit. To the extent that 
third-party remedies against shareholders disgorge improper benefits, 
directors have reduced incentives to bestow such benefits on shareholders. 
Thus, third-party remedies do not merely, ex post, force shareholders to 
return improper benefits; they also create ex ante incentives for corporate 
decisionmakers not to generate such benefits from the outset. 
From this perspective, remedies against shareholders as third parties serve 
as a proper response to a concern that the incentives of directors (and offic-
ers) are too closely aligned with those of shareholders.48 Indeed, remedies 
against shareholders have a significant advantage over remedies against 
directors: the former are less likely to result in excessive caution by direc-
tors, as both the full benefits of the corporate action and the full cost of a 
potential remedy accrue to shareholders.  
The challenge is to define what benefits must be returned (i.e., those 
that constitute improper benefits). Veil-piercing remedies are not problem-
atic at least to the extent a controlling shareholder can avoid them through 
honest behavior and routine adherence to corporate formalities.49 Fraudu-
lent conveyance law is more complicated. For instance, under fraudulent 
 
48 Cf. Rock, supra note 4, at Part IV (discussing legal solutions to the shareholder–manager 
agency cost problem). 
49 See Bainbridge, supra note 47, at 521 (observing a “well-nigh universal refusal to treat 
undercapitalization, standing alone, as dispositive” in a determination to pierce the corporate veil). 
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conveyance principles, a dividend paid, or an amount paid by a corporation 
to purchase its own shares, is a (constructive) fraudulent conveyance if the 
company is insolvent, is thereby rendered insolvent, or is left with unreason-
ably small capital.50 The baseline established by fraudulent conveyance 
law—insolvency or unreasonably small capital—is legislative, rather than 
contractual. This might be of little concern because the insolvency baseline 
is sufficiently lax that one can reasonably assume it does not impose 
unwanted terms on contractual relationships. As we explain more fully 
immediately below, however,51 the baseline of unreasonably small capital is 
more difficult to defend at least because it is imprecise. In any case, our 
intuitions about what investors prefer matter little to our analysis. In Part 
IV, we suggest that the law permit contractually created remedies against 
shareholders as third parties; such remedies could be set to different 
standards and could be more clearly defined than provisions under current law. 
Just as a debtor’s shareholders can improperly benefit at the expense of 
creditors, so can a debtor’s corporate affiliates, which may be directly or 
indirectly controlled by a debtor’s shareholders. Consequently, veil-piercing 
and fraudulent conveyance laws provide remedies against corporate affiliates 
as well, and in our view, are generally appropriate to the same extent.52 
 
50 Though specific provisions and some terminology differ, these fraudulent conveyance 
principles are common to federal bankruptcy law and state law. For federal bankruptcy purposes, 
however, section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006), has been interpreted 
to bar recovery of payments to shareholders made through financial intermediaries. See Enron 
Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 651 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2011); see generally Rock, 
supra note 4, at subsection IV.A.1 (discussing bankruptcy law in the context of failed leveraged 
buyouts). 
Corporate law rules generally have similar or weaker standards for unlawful dividends and 
stock repurchases. In most states other than Delaware, dividends and share repurchases are 
unlawful if the company is or is rendered thereby insolvent or has no surplus. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. LAW § 510 (Consol. 2012). As described above, in Delaware, even companies with no 
surplus may pay any dividends out of current profits or out of the combined profits of the current 
and the prior fiscal year. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170. Shareholders who had knowledge of facts 
indicating that the dividend or purchase was unlawful are required to return the amounts received. 
Id. § 174(c); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 719(d). 
51 We discuss fraudulent conveyance law again below. See infra text accompanying note 59. 
52 This is not to say that every remedy against a shareholder would be equally justifiable 
against a corporate affiliate. For example, it might be fully appropriate for a creditor to pierce a 
subsidiary’s corporate veil and reach assets of a controlling shareholder, while at the same time 
wholly inappropriate for a creditor to reach assets of the subsidiary’s sibling corporation at the 
expense of the sibling’s creditors. We discuss the issue of corporate affiliate liability again in Part 
IV, infra. 
  
2013] Technology of Creditor Protection 1791 
 
C. Remedies Against Other Creditors 
A third-party claim can also be asserted against other creditors. Under 
present law, such remedies against creditors are based on both the control 
and improper benefit rationales. For present purposes, we discuss two 
existing types of remedies: those that relate to voidable preferences and 
those that relate to fraudulent conveyances in the context of a leveraged 
buyout.  
Under federal bankruptcy law, certain payments made to other creditors 
prior to a bankruptcy filing are recoverable as voidable preferences. Gener-
ally, a payment is recoverable if it is made within ninety days of a bankruptcy 
filing, while the debtor was insolvent, and resulted in a recovery greater 
than the repaid claim would have received in the debtor’s liquidation had 
the payment not been made.53 The standard rationale is not merely equitable, 
or ex post; that is, the standard rationale is not merely the notion that it is 
improper for creditors who get paid shortly before a bankruptcy to end up 
in a better position than similarly situated creditors who did not get paid. 
Deterrence is an additional component to the classical preference story. The 
idea is that if a creditor anticipates that it will have to return any collection 
made on the eve of a bankruptcy filing, it will have a diminished incentive 
to monitor the debtor wastefully in preparation for a race to assets as well as 
a diminished incentive to conduct the race and collect prior to bankruptcy—
perhaps dismembering a viable debtor in the process. But this standard 
explanation is wanting; it is static, as it incorrectly imagines that a creditor’s 
bankruptcy filing is preordained rather than dependent on the creditors’ 
collection efforts. Despite the prospect of avoidance, because bankruptcy 
may not be imminent, creditors may have an incentive to collect even when 
collection costs are positive.54  
Still, preference law has consequences that may well protect creditors. 
The prospect that a bankruptcy trustee will later recover a collection may 
induce some creditors to investigate, and perhaps declare a default against, a 
debtor earlier in the debtor’s financial decline.55 The creditors may thus 
protect themselves and other creditors who are not in a position to monitor 
the debtor directly, but who might react to the early withdrawal.56 Moreover, 
 
53 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006). Different rules apply if a payment is made to or for the benefit of 
an insider. Id. 
54 See Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 575, 581 (1995) (discussing the deterrent effects of preference law). 
55 See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Gov-
ernance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1094-96 (1995). 
56 See id. (explaining how voidable preferences encourage better lender monitoring efforts). 
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because a bankruptcy trustee may reverse an eve-of-bankruptcy debt 
collection, or grant of a security interest, a lender may be hesitant to finance 
a debtor’s continuation, and continuous decline, with the promise of early 
maturity on a new loan or security on an existing one.57 Such reluctance 
might lead a failed debtor to an earlier bankruptcy, and perhaps an efficient 
liquidation, thus benefiting creditors that would have suffered from contin-
uation.58 
A second, related third-party remedy against creditors is based on 
fraudulent conveyance in the context of a leveraged buyout (LBO).59 There 
are multiple ways that an LBO can be structured. One typical structure 
involves the creation of an acquisition vehicle, “Acquisition Corp.,” that 
obtains some equity contributions from the ultimate purchaser and borrows 
a much greater amount of additional funds. Acquisition Corp. then acquires 
the stock of the target corporation and merges with it. Whether structured 
in this or some other fashion, when the dust settles, the former shareholders 
of the target corporation are cashed out and the target corporation is owned, 
directly or indirectly, by the ultimate purchaser who contributed only a 
fraction of the purchase price to the acquisition. The remainder of the 
purchase price consists of debt, typically secured by the target’s assets, and, 
as a result of a merger or otherwise, the target corporation becomes obligated 
to pay the debt incurred in the LBO. 
From the perspective of the target corporation and its creditors, an LBO 
results in more debt (often of higher priority), new owners, and not neces-
sarily any benefits. To be sure, LBO proponents may claim that new 
management and a concentrated equity ownership will promote productive 
business innovation and unprecedented diligence. And this claim may be 
correct, but it may not be. Because some of the costs of an LBO are borne 
by pre-LBO creditors, equity’s option value on the highly leveraged firm 
may be hugely valuable even while that value is fed by, and promotes, 
inefficient overinvestment in risky projects, with ruin a significant possibility.  
Courts, therefore, may be on solid ground when they use fraudulent 
conveyance law to devalue claims held by lenders who finance an LBO. 
Even though these lenders contribute real money, this money ends up in the 
hands of the shareholders of the target corporation, not in the target 
corporation itself. Courts have reasoned, therefore, that if the target 
 
57 Adler, supra note 54, at 597-98. 
58 See id. 
59 We do not here discuss lender liability and deepening insolvency, which are actions that 
bear a family resemblance to fraudulent conveyances. Our proposed contract-based third-party 
remedy, described below in connection with these doctrines, would permit parties to fashion their 
own versions of such actions. 
  
2013] Technology of Creditor Protection 1793 
 
corporation is insolvent after the LBO, or if it is left unreasonably under-
capitalized, the obligations to the creditors that finance the LBO are 
voidable as fraudulent transfers.60 In effect, avoidance subordinates the 
LBO lenders’ claims or, if a court avoids just the security interest, reduces 
those claims to the same level of priority as other claims. 
The application of fraudulent conveyance law to LBO lenders can be 
defended if it encourages those who finance an LBO to assure that the debt 
incurred in the LBO does not render the company insolvent or nearly so, at 
least unless such financial instability is justified by the upside of the transac-
tions. LBO lenders are an integral party to the LBO transaction; they are, 
through their lending decisions, in a position to control whether the LBO 
occurs and how much debt is incurred. LBO lenders can also derive sub-
stantial profits (through fees and interest income) from a successful LBO. 
Thus, when LBO lenders face a risk of reduced priority for the debts owed 
to them, they may appropriately exercise more caution in their lending 
decisions. That is, fraudulent conveyance rules may usefully force an LBO 
lender to internalize the costs the lender imposes.  
 Beyond theory, though, and as intimated above, a determination that a 
debtor is insolvent or too thinly capitalized is as much art as science.61 The 
risk of a court finding, after the fact, that an LBO unduly subjected early, 
unsecured creditors to risk may well make potential LBO lenders excessively 
cautious, perhaps deterring LBOs that could, through the replacement of 
management or the elimination of free cash flows, enhance the target’s value.  
In the next Part, we suggest an expansion of remedies against creditors 
that are not parties to contracts breached by debtors. As in the case of 
fraudulent conveyance law, the rationale for imposing such remedy is that 
creditors are, through their lending decisions, in a position of control and 
can be expected to exercise such control more appropriately if they are 
forced to internalize the costs of the transactions they finance. However, 
unlike fraudulent conveyance law, the remedy we propose is optional and 
 
60 See, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff ’d sub 
nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying fraudulent 
conveyance law to a leveraged buyout on both actual and constructive fraud theories); see also 11 
U.S.C. §§ 544, 548 (2006) (providing for application of fraudulent conveyance law in bankruptcy). 
We do not endorse any particular doctrinal analysis. Rather, we recognize the potential efficacy of 
a rule that holds a lender liable, as an LBO participant, for the negative consequences, borne by 
early creditors, of the transactions it finances. Even so, as we explain below, we favor early creditor 
self-protection over fraudulent conveyance rules that provide untailored, and perhaps unwanted, 
protection. 
61 See, e.g., Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1072-73 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding 
that “the test for unreasonably small capital is reasonable foreseeability,” which in Moody hinged on 
whether “the parties’ projections were reasonable”). 
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based on contractual principles. Consequently, the baseline for imposing the 
remedy would be determined by the parties and would apply only to the 
extent that a company and its pre-existing creditors agreed. Thus, if a 
company were concerned that the possibility of a third-party remedy against 
future creditors would unduly impede its ability to obtain future credit, it 
would be free not to opt in to such a remedy. As we explain below, we 
would extend this option to permit a firm’s retreat from current fraudulent 
conveyance standards, allowing financial creditors to fend for themselves 
without any ability to undermine an LBO financier’s rights.62 
IV. LEGAL RULES IN THE AID OF CONTRACTS: A PROPOSAL FOR 
LEGAL RULES THAT CREATE OPTIONAL THIRD-PARTY  
REMEDIES FOR CREDITORS 
As we explained in Part II, among contractual parties, lenders face an 
atypical problem. Unless fully secured, lenders know from the outset that 
they cannot confidently rely on standard breach-of-contract remedies when 
a debtor breaches a protective covenant, one designed to reduce the risk of 
nonpayment. If the breach of such a covenant results in insolvency and 
nonpayment, then damages from breach may not be recoverable. As a result, 
remedies against third parties with respect to breaches of these covenants 
may be more important than for other types of breaches. Yet, given the 
difficulty of contracting with third parties—because their identities may not 
be known at the time creditors lend funds or because the number of such 
parties may be large—imposing such remedies directly, through contract, 
may be costly or impracticable. 
Put another way, creditor remedies matter most when a debtor is insol-
vent (i.e., unable to satisfy all obligations), but when a debtor is insolvent, a 
remedy exclusively against the debtor may prove meaningless. We therefore 
suggest that the law create a mechanism for the enforcement of contractually 
based remedies against third parties. Importantly, this mechanism would be 
optional. Remedies against third parties would be created only if, and only 
to the extent, a loan agreement or a provision in the debtor’s corporate 
 
62 Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson have criticized the application of fraudulent conveyance 
law to leveraged buyouts and, as we do here, have argued that, if creditors want protection of that 
sort, it could be supplied by contract. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent 
Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 854 (1985) (concluding that the 
“fraudulent conveyance remedy is far easier to contract into than it is to contract out of”). 
Creditors could not opt into a fraudulent conveyance regime, however, unless, as we recommend 
in this Article, the law permitted the imposition of third-party liability. It is not clear whether 
Baird and Jackson had such legal reform in mind.  
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charter63 so provided. Optionality is a crucial element of the mechanism we 
propose. Although there are theoretical reasons to believe that third-party 
liability may be efficient, and that transactions costs prevent the direct 
contractual imposition of such liability, this does not imply that any particular 
type of remedy against third parties, or for that matter any at all, is in fact 
 
63 It might prove impracticable to impose third-party liability through corporate charter 
provisions. For one reason, it is unclear to what extent the corporate charter can impose liability 
on shareholders (especially noncontrolling shareholders) or creditors of a corporation. See, e.g., 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (2011) (setting forth provisions that may be contained in the 
charter). Specifically, it is not clear whether a provision imposing liability would be regarded as a 
provision “for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corpora-
tion” or as a provision “creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, 
the directors, and the stockholders.” Id. § 102(b)(1). Also, while the charter may contain “[a] 
provision imposing personal liability for the debts of the corporation on its stockholders to a 
specified extent and upon specified conditions,” see id. § 102(b)(6), this statutory provision would 
not permit imposition of liability on creditors, and it is unclear whether this provision would 
permit imposition of liability on any former shareholder. Second, given choice-of-law and 
jurisdiction principles, it may be difficult to enforce third-party liability provisions even if they are 
valid under the law of the firm’s domicile. Delaware generally could not exercise personal 
jurisdiction over parties merely because they are shareholders or creditors of a firm incorporated in 
Delaware. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring that a person have 
minimum contacts within a state for that state’s courts to exercise personal jurisdiction). And 
while states generally look to the laws of the state of incorporation to govern the internal affairs of 
a firm, it is not clear whether remedies by creditors against other creditors or shareholders would 
be considered to fall within the scope of the internal affairs doctrine. See Faith Stevelman, 
Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
57, 68 (2009) (“Within corporate law, ‘internal affairs’ encompasses the statutory and judicial 
standards defining the corporation’s legal personhood, rules for . . . effectuating mergers and 
acquisitions, charter and bylaw amendments, procedures for shareholder and board voting and 
meetings, and the rights and responsibilities of shareholders, officers, and directors.”). Third, any 
charter provision would have to be approved by the company’s shareholders. Tit. 8, § 242(b). The 
process of creating third-party remedies through a charter provision would thus be more 
cumbersome than the process we are proposing. Fourth, under general rules of corporate law, the 
charter may be changed with the approval of the board of directors and the shareholders. Id. 
Under the general rules, therefore, charter provisions would offer only weak protection because 
they could be changed without creditor approval. To be sure, this problem could be overcome as 
the charter could confer limited voting rights on creditors to give them veto power over the 
respective charter provision and further require that, upon a merger or consolidation, the 
surviving entity retain equivalent charter provisions. See id. § 221. But such voting rights may give 
excessive protection to creditors, for example, by giving them veto power over a reincorporation 
into a state that does not recognize such a charter provision. Fifth, a charter is best suited for the 
provision of global rules, and the remedies we have in mind might be specific to individual 
contracts—the protection, for example, of one bond issue but not another—and so the charter may 
not be an ideal repository of covenants to be enforced against third parties. Similar limitations 
would apply to the use of by-laws as a source of third-party liability. 
All this said, we are not opposed to the idea of the corporate charter as the source of remedies 
against third parties. As we explain below, we believe that for a contract to impose third-party 
liability there should be public notice of that remedy, and a charter is a reasonable location for 
public notice. Thus, we would favor legal reform that would make charter provisions enforceable 
against third parties.  
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desirable.64 By making the imposition of third-party liability optional, we 
would leave the ultimate determination to the contracting parties. 
Our proposal builds on a suggestion by one of us that a firm and a subset 
of its investors should be permitted generally to enter contractual arrange-
ments that bind investors who are not parties to the contract.65 The context 
of this original proposal was a thought experiment in which a firm mini-
mized its cost of capital through the abjuration of all traditional debt and 
the replacement of such debt with a special type of preferred equity (re-
ferred to as “Chameleon Equity”).66 Such a firm could exist in the real 
world only if it could effectively bind itself, either in its corporate charter or 
through public recordation, to the renunciation of debt at the time of 
incorporation and in the future.67 The initial proposal, which is conceptually 
related to ours here, is to provide a mechanism through which a firm could 
reliably bind itself not to take certain actions so that any purported issuance 
of a right in violation of a contract would be unenforceable against the firm, 
and not merely give rise to a breach of contract claim against the firm. 
Subsequent development of this idea gave rise to additional proposals 
closely related to the topic we address here. As discussed earlier, a possible 
role of voidable preference rules is to discourage a distressed debtor’s 
inefficient investment financed by later creditors at the expense of earlier 
creditors. The preference rules, however, are limited to the repayment of 
loans, or the issuance of a security interest, within a short period prior to 
bankruptcy. In response to this limitation, as suggested by one of us, a 
debtor perhaps should be permitted to adopt an extension of the preference 
rules such that any loan made during the debtor’s insolvency would be 
unenforceable except on terms no more favorable in maturity or priority 
than those of debt obligations already issued and outstanding.68 A further, 
more prosaic proposal was to extend the secured-credit system so that it 
 
64 We do not imagine that a debtor would covenant for creditor protection then refuse to opt 
into third-party liability so that it may later breach without consequence. Rather, because liability 
may be hard to determine, or damages difficult to measure, depending on the remedy, a debtor 
might decide that the uncertainty of third-party liability would, beyond the covenant itself, unduly 
chill the opportunity for later financing. 
65 See Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 6, at 336-39. 
66 Id. at 323-24. 
67 Id. at 336-39. 
68 See Barry E. Adler et al., Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 11, 29 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 20), available at http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/ 
early/2012/02/06/jleo.ewr004.full.pdf+html (“To raise the cost of loans taken by an insolvent 
debtor, the law could simply deny the loans priority or early maturity regardless of the loans’ 
contractual terms.”); see also Barry E. Adler, Accelerated Resolution of Financial Distress, 76 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1169, 1176 (1998) (making the same point). 
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would enforce against third parties not only security interests, but also 
negative pledges against the issuance of secured credit.69  
The common theme here is that certain kinds of legal arrangements 
between a firm and its creditors are difficult to establish purely through 
traditional contract. Our proposal here is designed largely to broaden the 
set of arrangements that parties can devise through private ordering by 
establishing a mechanism for the contractual creation of remedies against 
third parties.70 
To be sure, in the mechanism we propose, it will be the debtor and a 
creditor that decide on the imposition of any third-party liability. Share-
holders, corporate affiliates, and future creditors—the targets of the reme-
dies we envision—do not explicitly consent. However, as we discuss below, 
the debtor company will have significant incentives to take into account the 
interests of shareholders, affiliates, and future investors (equityholders or 
creditors) in deciding whether to agree to the imposition of third-party 
liability. Significantly, our proposal also includes mechanisms for third-
party self-protection. We propose that a creditor could not be made liable as 
a third party unless, at the time of its investment, it was aware of or on 
public notice of any rule or remedy that would affect it. Additionally, we 
would not have the law permit contractual third-party liability against 
shareholders or corporate affiliates unless a charter provision expressly 
permitted a firm to enter into contracts that imposed such liability. Thus, a 
shareholder subject to third-party liability would either invest with actual or 
constructive knowledge of this prospect or would have an opportunity to 
vote on a charter amendment that permitted third-party liability. And 
corporate affiliates would rely on the discretion of their shareholder parents.71 
This third-party liability proposal follows the secured credit model, 
which creates a property interest good against past and future creditors but 
 
69 See Adler, Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 409 (recommending that entry in a public record 
be sufficient to “make universally enforceable a debtor’s commitment to leave some or all of its 
assets unencumbered” (citation omitted)); see also generally Bjerre, supra note 6 (usefully expounding 
the utility of negative pledges). As discussed infra Part V, although it is possible under current law 
to secure a negative pledge, there are inherent limitations in such security. 
70 Our focus here is on the operation of the proposed third-party liability mechanism. We do 
not express an opinion on whether the law that would authorize or facilitate the mechanism should 
be state or federal (or, for that matter, part of a multinational convention). 
71 Every investor implicitly agrees to the law that will govern its investment, and so, transi-
tion issues aside, every third-party investor in some sense consents to whatever liability the law 
permits a debtor and creditor to impose by contract. Nevertheless, our view of implicit consent is 
less tautological. As suggested by the text, we imagine that the law would, for the most part, not 
allow debtors and creditors to impose liability contractually on a third party unless, at the time of 
its investment, the third party either had actual or constructive notice of such liability or had 
chosen to leave itself exposed. 
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only with notice of such interest. Simply put, we aim to broaden the scope 
of creditor protection that secured credit now provides in a needlessly 
narrow fashion. Given this background, we begin a discussion below of our 
proposal for contractual third-party liability with an analysis of remedies 
against other creditors. We then turn to related remedies against shareholders 
and corporate affiliates and make some observations about how our proposal 
compares with remedies under existing law.72 
A. Remedies Against Other Creditors 
As part of our proposal for third-party liability, we suggest the creation 
of an optional remedy against a creditor (a “new” creditor) who lends on 
terms that violate a covenant in a loan agreement between a pre-existing 
creditor (an “early” creditor) and a common debtor. A number of common 
covenants in loan agreements prohibit specified subsequent agreements with 
other creditors. These provisions limit, for example, the total amount of 
debt that a company may incur, the debt of or guarantees by the company’s 
subsidiaries, the right of subsidiaries to restrict dividends, or the ability of 
the company to grant a security interest to other creditors.  
The trigger for remedies against third parties would be contractual in 
several respects. First, a remedy would be imposed only if an agreement 
with a new creditor violated a term contained in the agreement with an 
early creditor. That is, the baseline substantive standard would be based in 
contract. Second, a remedy would be imposed only if the agreement with an 
early creditor specifically provided for third-party liability in the event of a 
breach of a specific term. Third, a remedy would be imposed to benefit only 
those early creditors that contracted for third-party liability. 
To understand how such remedies might operate, consider the following 
illustration. Debtor has $100 in assets and is subject to $100 in unsecured 
debt. Under the terms of the unsecured debt contract, Debtor promises not 
to issue any secured debt and opts into a third-party liability regime. Yet, in 
violation of this negative pledge covenant, Debtor borrows an additional 
$100 and pledges all of Debtor’s assets as security. Debtor then invests all 
$200 of its assets—that is, its initial $100 plus the new loan proceeds—in a 
risky project that fails, inducing Debtor to enter bankruptcy with only $50 
in assets. Absent third-party liability, the secured lender, with a lien on all 
 
72 In principle, our proposal would permit the imposition of liability on other sorts of third 
parties—purchasers, for example. We limit our analysis to creditors, shareholders, and corporate 
affiliates, however, because we perceive them as the most likely targets of such liability. See supra 
note 8.  
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Debtor’s assets, would collect the entire $50 estate, and the unsecured 
lenders would receive no payment and have no remedy for Debtor’s breach. 
It is left to consider, then, the extent of a third-party remedy against the 
secured lender. 
In a third-party liability regime, the unsecured creditors might, at the 
least, be able to set aside the lien that violated the negative pledge covenant, 
with the result that they and the secured lender would share Debtor’s assets 
on a pro rata basis (for a recovery of $25 each). This outcome amounts, in 
essence, to an avoidance of the later lender’s security interest with respect to 
the unsecured creditors that contracted for the negative pledge.73  
 This remedy is modest and easily enforceable, but it is not the only pos-
sibility. A more fulsome remedy could perhaps provide the unsecured 
creditors in this illustration subordination of the new lender’s secured claim. 
This would result in an award of $50 to the unsecured creditors and nothing 
to the new lender. Moreover, the unsecured creditors in this illustration 
might argue that, but for the secured loan, Debtor would have been unable 
to finance the risky project and that, if Debtor had not undertaken the 
project, the unsecured creditors would have been paid in full. Then, the 
remedy against the secured lender could be that it relinquish its $50 lien in 
favor of the unsecured creditors and pay the unsecured creditors an addi-
tional $50 in lender liability as consequential damages.74 
Where an early lender contracts for third-party liability but does not 
specify the nature of that liability, we would, where possible, limit the 
remedy to avoidance of the terms that violated the early lender’s loan 
agreement. In this illustration, such a remedy would be avoidance of the 
later lender’s security interest and a $50 recovery for unsecured creditors. 
We would permit an early lender and debtor to contract for a more exten-
sive remedy, such as subordination or full expectation damages, but only if 
the loan agreement between the debtor and early lender clearly imposed 
such remedy. Our caution here is twofold. First, we are concerned that the 
 
73 In our illustration, all the early creditors contracted for a negative pledge, and the parties 
opted into a third-party liability regime. By contrast, consistent with the minimal recovery 
described here, if creditors holding only $50 of early claims had contracted for such provision, only 
those creditors would obtain the benefit of the remedy, for a pro rata recovery of $12.50. The 
secured creditor would be entitled to the security interest with respect to the other early creditors 
and obtain a total recovery of $37.50. The early creditors who did not contract for a negative 
pledge, or did not contract to have such pledge enforceable against a third party, would receive a 
$0 recovery. Thus, the remedy described here does not constitute subordination and need not 
constitute entire avoidance. 
74 As in the case of the more modest remedy described above, we propose that a subordina-
tion or expectation remedy would accrue only to the benefit of those early creditors who contracted 
for such remedy. 
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parties might prefer not to contract for a more extensive remedy, which 
might chill later investment or be difficult to calculate, or both. Second, 
even if such remedy were adequately publicized—a desirable prerequisite of 
third-party liability to which we turn momentarily—participants in the 
financial community might be slow to understand the consequences of a 
change in the law to permit third-party liability. Therefore, we believe that 
third-party liability should not casually attach. It follows, of course, that we 
do not recommend that the law permit the parties to contract for third-
party liability in excess of full compensation for breach—that is, punitive 
damages, which are not enforceable under general principles of contract law. 
We are mindful that, whatever the merit of our proposal, it would not be 
costless to implement. Costs to minimize can be divided into two catego-
ries: the costs of determining whether a debtor contracted for third-party 
liability and the costs arising from contracting for such a remedy. 
 The first set of costs—those relating to whether a debtor contracted for 
third-party liability—would be incurred by creditors of all debtors. Thus, 
when passed along in the form of higher fees or interest rates, these costs 
would be borne by all debtors, regardless of whether the debtors contracted 
for such a remedy. These costs could be significant, not because they would 
necessarily be large for any particular debtor, but because they are distributed 
so widely—beyond the debtors who would choose to impose third-party 
liability. 
The second set of costs, those arising from the contracting process itself, 
would be borne only by debtors who availed themselves of contracts for 
third-party liability. Such costs would include not only the expense of the 
debtor and creditor that contract to impose liability, but also the costs to 
new creditors of investigating the terms and underlying facts of discovered 
third-party liability agreements between debtors and early creditors. A new 
creditor would have to determine whether the earlier agreement would be 
violated and would have to decide whether and on what terms to extend 
credit. Related costs could arise from the possibility that new creditors 
might err in this determination and become subject to liability from inad-
vertent breach. These costs, which would extend beyond the mere determi-
nation that third-party liability had been invoked, could be nontrivial 
because covenants in loan agreements may contain multiple exceptions and 
carve-outs as well as occasional ambiguities.75 A detailed analysis both of the 
 
75 For an example of such covenants, see J.C. Penney Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 
4, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166126/000134100413000151/form_8k.htm, 
discussed infra in text accompanying note 97. 
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terms of an agreement and of the company’s prior use of any exceptions and 
carve-outs may be necessary to determine whether an agreement would be 
violated. 
All this said, it is easy to overstate the significance of these investigation 
costs. To begin, new lenders are well positioned to scrutinize a debtor’s 
affairs and have an incentive to do so even absent the prospect of contractu-
ally imposed third-party liability. New lenders routinely ask debtors for 
important documents and other information and attempt to verify whether 
the information they are provided is complete and accurate. They, of course, 
also have the power to deny credit if they are not satisfied with the responses 
they receive. We therefore do not believe that the additional costs for new 
creditors generated by contracts for third-party liability would be prohibitive.  
In this regard, it is noteworthy that, unlike the determination of whether 
a debtor has contracted for third-party liability, investigation costs given the 
existence of a contract arise only for debtors that have voluntarily contracted 
for such liability. Because a new creditor can be expected to recuperate these 
costs from a debtor through higher fees or higher interest rates, a debtor has 
incentives to take them into account and incur them only if the benefits to 
be obtained (from early creditors) as a result of contracting for third-party 
liability exceed the costs imposed.  
The law, moreover, can be designed to minimize both sets of costs we 
have identified. We offer the following suggestions:  
First, we would require a creditor that contracted for third-party liability 
to file its agreement in a central depository. Failure to file an agreement 
would render unenforceable any included remedy against a third party. The 
natural depository would be the office for Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) filings in the debtor company’s state of incorporation.76 Generally, 
new creditors perform a UCC search in any case to determine whether a 
company has granted any security interests. To that extent, new creditors 
could at little or no additional cost discover any loan agreement that con-
tained a third-party liability provision potentially enforceable against them. 
Even for creditors that would not otherwise conduct a UCC search, the 
costs of such a search could be low. Thus, even though new creditors would 
need to search for third-party liability provisions in connection with loans 
 
76 To the extent that the agreement with the early creditors could be violated by agreements 
between new creditors and subsidiaries of the company, the agreement would also have to be filed 
in the office of the subsidiary’s state of incorporation. 
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to debtors who have imposed none, such universal search need not be 
excessively expensive.77  
Second, as may be implicit from our analysis, we would limit the right to 
contract for third-party remedies to legal entities. Accordingly, a new 
creditor would seldom if ever have difficulty identifying the appropriate 
depository. 
Third, because even a discovered provision for third-party liability may 
be difficult to interpret in context, we would limit the creation of third-
party liability to material new creditors; the materiality threshold could be 
determined after an analysis of search costs. This amount could be raised or 
lowered in light of the actual market demand for remedies against third 
parties. For a relatively mild remedy, such as the disgorgement of a security 
interest granted to an existing creditor in violation of a negative pledge 
clause, the materiality threshold could be modest. Ignorance of a mild 
remedy might not be very costly, just as a creditor’s ignorance of the 
voidable preference rules under current law may not be very costly. If, 
however, a remedy imposed greater liability, such as an award of consequential 
or punitive damages (if permitted by law),78 there likely should be a non-
trivial materiality standard. 
A materiality threshold would not merely save small, new creditors the 
cost of investigation. The size limitation would also mitigate a version of the 
arms-race problem, where creditors too small or insufficiently sophisticated 
to investigate would assume that they would face liability and would pass 
along the expected cost of such liability to the debtor.79 The debtor, in turn, 
would then have an incentive to impose the paid-for liability, whether or 
not liability made sense from an efficiency perspective. By contrast, substan-
tial creditors, particularly financial creditors, could relatively easily discover 
the presence or absence of liability, negotiate for their own rights against 
other creditors, if desired, and adjust their interest rates accordingly. As 
discussed further below, because even small or unsophisticated creditors 
could investigate and act to secure a debtor’s disclaimer of third-party 
 
77 A filing requirement would have the further benefit that new creditors would be able to 
investigate the scope of any third-party liability from an examination of filed agreements. 
78 See discussion of punitive damages supra Section IV.A. Although we noted concerns in that 
context over a newly created prospect of lender liability, even if provided for in a publicized 
contract between a debtor and earlier creditors, to the extent that the materiality threshold does its 
work, the significance of these concerns recedes. 
79 This arms-race problem was identified, though in different terms and a somewhat different 
context, in Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996). 
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liability against them, inefficient investment spawned by an arms race might 
be limited to the transactions costs of such investigation and action.  
The observation that the expected cost of third-party liability would be 
passed along to the debtor has efficiency implications beyond the materiality 
standard and arms-race problem just described. The costs of remedies 
against third parties would make new lenders more reluctant to extend 
credit and would affect the terms of any credit they extended (e.g., they 
could demand higher fees or higher interest rates). This behavior, however, 
is precisely what third-party liability is designed to induce. For the most 
part, the costs of third-party liability would be borne by the debtors who 
contract for third-party remedies with early creditors. To the extent that 
debtors are forced to internalize the costs of third-party remedies imposed 
on new creditors, they have proper incentives to include such remedies in 
their agreement with early creditors only to the extent such remedies are 
efficient. For example, inasmuch as the rationale for third-party liability is 
that the contractual remedies of debt acceleration and damages against the 
debtor may not be effective in the event of the debtor’s insolvency, the 
availability of any remedy against new creditors might be conditioned on 
the debtor’s insolvency, as evinced by bankruptcy or a payment default after 
acceleration. In addition, the parties might limit the remedy to agreements 
with new creditors that occurred within a reasonably short time span, 
perhaps one year, prior to bankruptcy initiation or a payment default; such 
limitation may be a sensible way to encourage useful monitoring, by credi-
tors that would benefit from the imposition of third-party liability, and to 
provide new creditors with greater certainty. New creditors would be 
cautious, but we would not expect them to be overly cautious because they 
would be driven by profit motive to finance efficient projects, even risky 
ones, provided that the debtor were willing to pay the price. Thus, a debtor 
would be discouraged from the pursuit of projects that are too risky but 
might still finance other projects. 
This observation is consonant with accepted finance theory. The debt–
equity conflict induces equity to prefer too much risk and creditors to prefer 
too little. When equity controls management, creditors seek to limit 
excessive risk, which managers may pursue, despite natural risk aversion, as 
faithful agents or as the only hope to save their jobs. To combat unjustifiably 
risky investment, early creditors may contract for priority, typically through 
the use of secured credit, so that it becomes difficult for equity and a 
subsequent lender to externalize risk on earlier creditors.80 As described 
 
80 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989) (calling 
for first-in-time priority as the general default rule); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, 
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above, both voidable preference and fraudulent conveyance law may similarly 
induce debtor internalization of risk and thus discourage inefficient invest-
ment. To be sure, inhibitions on the externalization of risk may also dis-
courage efficient investment, but the restriction may be worthwhile 
nonetheless.81 Our proposal here for third-party creditor liability is in the 
same vein and allows a firm to balance the benefits and costs of protection 
for early creditors. 
B. Remedies Against Shareholders and Corporate Affiliates 
In addition to remedies against third-party creditors, we suggest that the 
law accommodate optional remedies against third-party shareholders. 
Remedies would be triggered if the company made a payment or distribu-
tion to shareholders, purchased stock or other equity securities from 
shareholders, or entered into a transaction with shareholders that violated a 
covenant in a loan agreement with early creditors. Loan agreements commonly 
contain a number of covenants that pertain to shareholders, including 
provisions restricting the amount of dividends the company may pay and 
the amount it can expend on purchasing its own shares, provisions requiring 
the maintenance of a certain net worth, and provisions requiring that any 
agreement between the company and a controlling shareholder (or its 
affiliate) be on terms that are fair to the company.  
As in the case of remedies against creditors, we propose that remedies 
against shareholders would be contractual. The remedies would be triggered 
if the company breached a term contained in a loan agreement with early 
creditors in a manner that benefited shareholders. The conditions for 
enforcement would be similar to those for remedies against creditors. To be 
enforceable against shareholders, the agreement with early creditors would 
have to specifically impose a third-party remedy for a breach of a specified 
term. The remedy would benefit only those early creditors that contracted 
for the imposition of such a remedy; would be limited, where possible, to 
avoidance of the violation unless a different remedy were contractually 
 
Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Comment, 34 J. FIN. 247, 250 (1979) 
(describing secured credit as a means to avoid asset substitution). There are other uses of secured 
credit, as a solution to underinvestment, for example. See, e.g., René M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An 
Analysis of Secured Debt, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 501 (1985) (observing that profitable projects may not be 
undertaken by firms that can use only unsecured debt to finance them but may be undertaken by 
firms that can use secured debt). 
81 See, e.g., Elazar Berkovitch & E. Han Kim, Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced 
Over- and Under-Investment Incentives, 45 J. FIN. 765 app. B (1990) (identifying competing 
concerns); cf. Stulz & Johnson, supra note 80 (describing efficient investment induced by priority 
for a later creditor). 
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specified; and would in any case be limited by the harm from the violation. 
Also, to be enforceable, the agreement would have to be filed in some 
central depository. 82  As in the case of remedies against creditors, we 
imagine that the parties would contract so the availability of any remedy 
against shareholders would be conditioned on the debtor’s insolvency 
proceeding or a payment default after an acceleration of the early creditors’ 
debt, and we anticipate that the remedy against shareholders would be 
limited to violations within a reasonably short time prior to such initiation 
or default. 
Remedies against shareholders may be beneficial even if they do not 
induce the shareholders to intervene in the management of a firm. An 
additional basis for such remedies, a variant of the control rationale, is that 
directors and officers of a firm are less likely to authorize a violation of a 
loan covenant, such as a restriction on the payment of dividends, if share-
holders are deprived of profit from that violation. Although the existence of 
third-party shareholder liability would impose potential costs on share-
holders, companies that are run for the benefit of shareholders would be 
expected to take these costs into account in deciding whether to incorporate 
such remedies in their loan agreements. Companies would have an incentive 
to incorporate such a remedy only if it minimized the debtor’s cost of 
capital and were thus efficient. 
The question arises whether management’s role as the shareholders’ 
agent sufficiently establishes the shareholders’ implied consent to third-
party shareholder liability. Under current law, through the mere issuance of 
debt, management can subordinate shareholders’ interests in the company’s 
assets to those of creditors. So, in some sense, third-party shareholder 
liability would not be a radical change. As a matter of caution, though, we 
would limit the contractual expansion of liability against third-party 
shareholders to those firms with a charter provision that permits the 
imposition of such liability. An even more cautious approach would limit 
liability to shareholders who have invested subsequent to, and with actual or 
constructive notice of, a contract that seeks to impose liability. Such caution, 
though, could greatly weaken or slow the efficacy of our proposal because 
equity shares (unlike debt) are not routinely retired and replaced. Moreover, 
 
82 Filing of an agreement in a central depository would usefully disseminate information for 
the benefit of future investors and would thus be useful even if, as we recommend and explain 
below, third-party liability could be imposed on shareholders who invested prior to the agreement. 
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because directors and officers owe the same fiduciary duty to all share-
holders, this limitation could create problematic conflicts of interest.83 
Our proposal could accommodate contractual third-party liability 
against corporate affiliates as well, but this liability could be more problem-
atic than liability against shareholders. While the interests of a debtor’s 
directors and officers may align with those of the debtor’s shareholders, the 
directors’ and officers’ interests would be less likely to align with those of a 
corporate affiliate. For example, a debtor’s parent corporation might seek to 
externalize the cost of third-party liability on the debtor’s sibling corpora-
tion and thus on the sibling’s minority shareholders and creditors.84 We do 
not deny that the prospect of such externalization would be a cost of our 
proposal if extended to corporate-affiliate liability. But members of a 
corporate affiliate are by their nature subject to (and to some extent protected 
by fiduciary duty from) the risk of self-interested control. We do not believe 
that adoption of our proposal would seriously exacerbate such risk. Thus we 
would permit contractual third-party liability against corporate affiliates 
under the same conditions that would apply to such liability against share-
holders. 
C. Short-Term and Nonfinancial Creditors 
Not all creditors would contract for third-party liability. Short-term 
creditors in particular may have little need to impose such liability. Like the 
covenants it supports, third-party liability is most useful when a debtor 
might otherwise freely exploit a creditor’s ignorance of or a change in 
circumstances.85 Where circumstances are not as a creditor perceived them, 
a debtor might take advantage of underpriced credit—which permits the 
externalization of risk—and invest inefficiently at that creditor’s expense for 
 
83 At least under some circumstances, a firm might be reluctant to impose liability on share-
holders who would be reasonably unaware that their actions violated any covenant. For example, a 
shareholder might inadvertently participate in a violation of a loan covenant against a debtor’s 
stock repurchase when she sells her shares unknowingly to the debtor in an anonymous open 
market transaction. The prospect of liability for such a breach might chill investment in the 
debtor’s stock, and a firm might reasonably foreswear, in its charter, the option to impose liability 
in such a situation. This example also highlights a practical difficulty in the imposition of liability 
triggered by an open market transaction: it may be difficult or impossible to match buyers and 
sellers. Third-party liability would not attach in this case, or it would apply pro rata to participants 
in a transaction. 
84 Cf. supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the imposition of liability on corpo-
rate affiliates). 
85 A change in circumstance is a necessary source of exploitation when parties are fully 
informed because any known condition, including the debtor’s current and planned future 
investments, present at the time of a loan would be priced as part of the loan. 
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the benefit of equity or other creditors. However, short-term creditors, even 
large ones, may have little concern about changed circumstances or mis-
information as they are largely protected by early maturity, which enables 
lenders to withdraw funds quickly if they are not satisfied. That is, when 
changed circumstances come to light, or misinformation is corrected, a 
debtor has relatively little opportunity to exploit a short-term extension of 
credit made on the basis of prior assumptions. Short maturity thus acts as at 
least a partial substitute for covenants: covenants enable creditors to 
accelerate (i.e., seek to withdraw their funds) contingent on a covenant 
violation that triggers an event of default, while short maturity enables 
creditors to withdraw funds at will without significant delay. It follows that 
short-term creditors, including short-term nonfinancial creditors, may have 
little need for loan covenants and would thus have little need for third-party 
liability to enforce loan covenants, or at least no need large enough to justify 
the transactions costs of loan covenants or their enforcement.  
The question then arises whether lenders who do not covenant for pro-
tection beyond early maturity should be afforded additional protection by 
law. The argument in favor of additional protection is that some short-term 
creditors, such as many trade creditors, hold claims so small that they will 
not closely investigate the specific financial condition of companies to whom 
they extend credit.86 These nonfinancial creditors have been referred to as 
“nonadjusting” consensual creditors.87 It has been suggested that legal (as 
opposed to contractual) protections against exploitation of such creditors 
would usefully reduce a version of the arms-race problem discussed above. 
A small (or unsophisticated) short-term creditor, without protection and 
absent good information about the debtor, may assume the worst and charge 
an interest rate that compensates it for exploitation, leaving the debtor with 
an incentive to exploit to the extent possible, efficiency aside.88  
We are agnostic about the need for extra-contractual protection even of 
small, nonfinancial creditors. First, we are not convinced that such creditors 
are in all cases truly uninformed. Even a small trade creditor will usually 
have some information about the company. At a minimum, the creditor will 
know whether the company pays the creditor’s own bills on time and may 
deduce additional information from the history and size of the company’s 
orders. The creditor may also have—through its dealings with other industry 
 
86 Even holders of large claims may be insufficiently sophisticated to investigate, but credi-
tors such as these may be rare. 
87 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 79, at 864 (noting that such creditors will remain “‘ration-
ally uninformed’ about the borrower’s financial structure”). 
88 See id. at 886. 
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participants or by virtue of the debtor’s public disclosures—some infor-
mation about the debtor’s general payment history, the debtor’s ability to 
tap into a revolving credit facility, and the state of the industry in which the 
debtor operates. In some cases, the creditor may have read about the 
company (e.g., that it has undergone a leveraged buyout or is rumored to 
file soon for bankruptcy). A creditor so informed could react to this infor-
mation, not necessarily by adjusting the interest rate or negotiating for 
covenants, but by demanding cash on the barrelhead for a time before 
extending further credit. Because small, unsophisticated creditors tend to be 
short term, this option may offer ample protection for the reasons discussed 
above: a creditor’s pre-existing debts would generally become due, and often 
be paid, before the debtor could exploit the creditor’s initial assessment of 
the debtor’s affairs.  
Second, even nonfinancial creditors need not be condemned to their 
plight. Such creditors may obtain a letter of credit—which shifts the risk of 
exploitation to a sophisticated actor—or a personal guarantee from a 
shareholder.  
Third, we are not sure the problem of nonadjusting creditors, even if 
unaddressed, is a large one. On the one hand, sophisticated creditors, along 
with the debtor, may exploit a nonadjusting creditor. But on the other, 
sophisticated creditors will often contract for self-protection measures, such 
as a limitation on debt or dividend payments, and thus can incidentally 
protect nonadjusting creditors.  
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, we are not convinced that it 
would necessarily be unduly expensive for a debtor, concerned over the 
interest rate being charged by nonadjusting creditors, to cure any infor-
mation asymmetry between it and a nonadjusting creditor. A debtor could 
do so through the offer of contract-based protection—itself enforceable 
against third parties, ideally—were it efficient to do so.89 
This leaves consideration of nonconsensual creditors, notably tort vic-
tims. Nonconsensual creditors have no ability to protect their interests 
through contract, no opportunity to ask for a personal guarantee or a letter 
of credit, and no ability to insist on cash up front. For that reason, and as 
several commentators have noted, it would be sensible to provide them with 
strong protection through legislation.90 A grant of highest priority, ahead of 
 
89 See Adler, Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 408-09. 
90 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1905, 1920-21 (1991) (arguing that exposing shareholders to 
unlimited tort liability for corporate acts would result in the net “gain[] of inducing risky 
corporations to internalize their full expected tort liability”); see also Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy 
Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219, 242-43 (2004) (“Every consideration, therefore, 
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all investors including all consensual creditors, unsecured or secured, would 
strike most as fair and would best align the incentives of investors with 
those of society. Priority for nonconsensual creditors would be efficient 
because it would force investors more fully to internalize the cost of a firm’s 
activity.91 Under current law, however, nonconsensual creditors are unse-
cured, with lower priority than secured creditors and priority on par with 
other unsecured creditors. Our proposal for contractual enforcement against 
third parties under specified circumstances would not change this priority 
perversion. But we would not exacerbate the problem by allowing early 
creditors to enforce a covenant against later nonconsensual creditors. 
V. OUR PROPOSED REMEDIES AND EXISTING LAW  
We view contractually based third-party liability as a modest proposal, 
similar to presently imposed remedies under preference and fraudulent 
conveyance law. Our remedy differs from current law in a number of 
important respects: our remedy would not apply unless a company affirma-
tively adopted it; our remedy would be available only to those creditors that 
contracted for it; and the baseline for the imposition and amount of our 
remedy would be determined by the parties.  
Compare, for example, a dividend paid by a company that is left with 
unreasonably small capital with a dividend paid by a company in violation 
of a covenant in a loan agreement. The former dividend is a fraudulent 
conveyance and can be recovered for the benefit of all creditors. As to the 
latter dividend, although the restriction imposed by the loan agreement—
the baseline—may well be tighter than the one imposed by fraudulent 
conveyance law, a third-party remedy against its recipients is available only 
if specifically provided for in the loan agreement, and recovery is limited to 
those creditors that have contracted for third-party liability.  
Furthermore, legally imposed and contractually imposed liability could 
differ in risk and uncertainty. To be sure, the contractual third-party liability 
we suggest would generate some uncertainty for third parties. Shareholders 
could be surprised when asked to return dividends they have received. New 
creditors may not expect to have a security interest invalidated. And such 
uncertainty is qualitatively similar to the uncertainty created by fraudulent 
conveyance and preference law. 92  But because debtors would have an 
 
seems to favor nonconsensual-claim priority, which would cause a company’s investors to 
internalize both the cost and the benefit of corporate activity (at least to the full extent of 
corporate assets).”). 
91 See supra note 90. 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 53-61.  
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incentive to reduce uncertainty—so that they could more easily obtain 
subsequent financing—one might expect contracts for objectively verifiable 
triggers to third-party liability, such as an insufficiency in specified cash 
reserves as opposed to “unreasonably small capital,” the latter being an 
inscrutable trigger of fraudulent conveyance law.93  
This raises an additional point. If our proposal were adopted, firms 
would, at least in some contexts, have less need for fraudulent conveyance 
law’s imposition of liability on third parties. As discussed above, fraudulent 
conveyance law has been used to avoid transfers in LBOs. But as noted, 
LBOs may enhance value as well as destroy value. Thus, although current 
bankruptcy law does not permit waiver, a debtor should be permitted 
contractually to foreswear the statutory avoidance of transfers used to 
finance projects it may wish to pursue.94 Permitting such a waiver would be 
particularly appropriate were debtors free to offer contractual protection 
against transfers, enforceable against third-party recipients. Under these 
circumstances, each debtor could, if it chose, replicate the legal protection 
now afforded as a matter of law or alter it as desired, with, for example, a 
less or more rigorous capitalization standard. Our proposal would allow a 
debtor to balance competing concerns and obtain only those protections of 
fraudulent conveyance law that it made sense to retain. 
Similarly, other legally imposed remedies against third parties might be 
altered under our proposal. For example, above we explained how a debtor 
might contract to extend voidable preference law, but there might well be 
circumstances under which a firm wishes to curtail the reach of such laws. 
An enhanced concern about an ability to finance projects comes to mind. 
The essence of our proposal is that debtors should be permitted, but not 
required, to create third-party liability in favor of early creditors. 
Whatever the merit of our proposed remedies against third parties, one 
might imagine that such remedies already exist in the form of tortious 
interference doctrine. Consider, for example, a bond covenant against the 
issuance of subsequent secured debt. If the debtor violated that covenant 
 
93 See supra note 61. 
94 A debtor and early creditor might decide that the excessive cost of later debt as a result of 
fraudulent conveyance protection might outweigh the savings from greater protection of early 
debt. A debtor might make this decision, for example, if the debtor and its creditors anticipated 
little opportunity for the debtor to pursue unduly risky projects and anticipated a significant 
possibility of underinvestment, that is, of profitable projects that the debtor’s equity investors 
would not pursue unless subsequent finance could be obtained on favorable terms. Note, however, 
that all else equal in a Coasean bargain, the threat of inefficient underinvestment may be more 
manageable than that of inefficient overinvestment. One might thus expect a firm to prefer some 
form of protection for early creditors. See Adler, Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 407-08 (discussing 
this observation in connection with an early, unpublished version of this Article). 
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and issued secured debt, the new lender might be liable to the bondholders 
under tort law for interfering with the covenant. This is plausible, but 
application of the tortious interference doctrine is uncertain; in this example, 
a court might reject the doctrine on the ground that its application would 
undermine the statutory priority established by the UCC.95 Even where it is 
undisputed that the tortious interference doctrine applies, the results may 
be haphazard, as the doctrine applies only when the interference is inten-
tional, a standard that may require not merely knowledge of the breached 
contract and its terms but also knowledge that the defendant’s action 
violates these terms. Under this standard, in our setting, the burden of any 
ambiguity likely falls on the early creditors. As a result of due diligence, a 
subsequent financial creditor may know of a contract with an early creditor 
and have to concede such knowledge; but the subsequent creditor might too 
easily evade tortious interference liability if it says it believed, even errone-
ously, that the contract with the early creditor was not violated.96 Moreover, 
the tortious interference standard, were it robust enough to matter, might 
be evaded by purposeful ignorance of early debt contracts and their terms. 
A recent dispute involving J.C. Penney Company, Inc. (JC Penney) illus-
trates why the tortious interference doctrine does not seem an adequate 
substitute for contractual third-party liability.97 On January 29, 2013, holders 
of a majority of JC Penney’s 7.4% debentures sent a notice of default to the 
company claiming that a credit agreement between the company and a 
group of banks violated a negative pledge covenant in the indenture pursu-
ant to which the debentures were issued. The credit agreement granted the 
banks a lien on JC Penney’s inventory, and the negative pledge covenant 
limited liens on “real property and tangible personal property owned by [JC 
Penney] . . . constituting a part of any store, warehouse or distribution 
center.”98 In response, JC Penney filed a declaratory judgment action on the 
 
95 Compare First Wyo. Bank, Casper v. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713, 717 (Wyo. 1988) (applying tortious 
interference law when a subsequent creditor knew about an earlier restrictive covenant), with U.S. 
Claims, Inc. v. Flomenhaft, 519 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (describing Mudge as “an 
‘outrageous’ and ‘unfortunate’ example of a court ‘mangling’ the clear UCC priority rules in the 
name of fairness and equity” (citing 1 BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ¶ 3.14[7]-[8] (rev. ed. 2006))). 
96 If a merely plausible argument can be made that a proposed action does not violate a covenant 
(and sometimes even if not), subsequent creditors may have little difficulty finding an outside law 
firm, or inside counsel, to opine that, while the issue is not free from doubt, a court would likely 
find no violation of the contract with early creditors. Though questionable, such an opinion may in 
itself enhance a good faith defense. 
97 The facts provided are taken from J.C. Penney Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 4, 2013), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166126/000134100413000151/form_8k.htm. 
98 Id. (ellipsis in original). 
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ground, among others, that inventory is not encompassed within the phrase 
“tangible personal property . . . constituting a part of any store, warehouse or 
distribution center.”99 
If the debenture holders prevail and the default is not cured, they will 
have the right to accelerate the debentures. But even if the debenture 
holders prevail against JC Penney, they would not necessarily prevail in a 
tortious interference action against the banks, as the banks could argue that 
they interpreted the negative pledge clause, in good faith, not to encompass 
inventory. 
As explained above, we propose that remedies against third parties be 
made effective by public filing; unless the parties so provided, we would not 
limit the remedy to cases where the third party had actual knowledge of, or 
intended to breach, the contract. Thus, in the JC Penney case, if the inden-
ture at issue had included a third-party remedy of the type we suggest, the 
banks’ good faith would not be at issue. In that case, regardless of the banks’ 
intent, if a court determined that the liens violated the negative pledge 
clause and JC Penney did not repay the debentures upon acceleration, the 
bondholders could assert a claim against the banks. 
Whatever the state of, or justification for, tortious interference claims or 
other tort-based lender-liability claims under current law,100 the justification 
would be strengthened if liability were imposed by contract between an 
early creditor and a debtor, where the debtor chose to incur the burden of 
higher interest imposed by the prospect of such liability on the debtor’s 
later borrowing. It is a central tenet of our proposal that the debtor, which 
internalizes its lenders’ expected costs, may choose its preferred liability 
regime. 
This brings us to another alternative: the use of the secured credit sys-
tem as support for loan covenants. Under current law, a debtor can pledge 
its assets as security for the performance of covenants in a loan agreement 
and allow the lender to perfect its interest through public recordation.101 So, 
for example, a debtor might covenant not to issue new debt, or new secured 
 
99 Id. 
100 For recent surveys of lender liability doctrine, see, for example, Gerald L. Blanchard, 
Lender Liability Update, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 1165 (William L. 
Norton, Jr. ed., 2010), and Lauren Colasacco, Note, Where Were the Accountants? Deepening 
Insolvency as a Means of Ensuring Accountants’ Presence when Corporate Turmoil Materializes, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 793 (2009). 
101 See RANDAL C. PICKER, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY: CASES, 
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 234-37 (4th ed. 2009) (describing a secured negative pledge under 
the UCC, but noting the potential for bankruptcy preference rules to avoid the benefits of such 
security); see also, e.g., Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 392 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1964) (negative pledge 
secured by an equitable lien on real estate). 
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debt, and may grant a creditor a security interest to provide the creditor’s 
claim priority in the event the debtor breaches the covenant. Such an 
arrangement—created by contract and thus tailored to the debtor’s needs—
bears a family resemblance to our proposed creditor protection. 
There are, however, differences between our proposal and the remedies 
currently available as part of the secured credit system. Most notably, our 
proposal would allow a breach victim to collect directly against a third party 
associated with a breach, including one who is not a creditor, while a 
security interest in a debtor’s assets operates only to alter the priority of 
claims against the debtor. The value of priority enhancement for a covenant 
breach is limited to the value of the debtor’s assets, and there are circum-
stances under which a security interest perfected by an early record of 
public notice, including one held by the victim of a covenant breach, can be 
trumped by a later interest.102 Moreover, because a reduction in a claim’s 
priority does not eliminate the claim, a potential third-party creditor may 
have a relatively low incentive to avoid participation in the debtor’s covenant 
breach. 
There is more. As presented here, our proposal is, in essence, a thought 
experiment. If legislation converted our abstract ideas to concrete law, the 
result would be a structural framework that could change the way in which 
creditor protection is perceived. We would expect the law to clarify 
enforcement ambiguities and to establish reasonable default rules. We 
would also expect innovation, including the creation of boilerplate provi-
sions on which parties might inexpensively rely. Consider, for example, that 
under current law there are not, to our knowledge, many instances of a 
negative pledge secured independently of a payment obligation. That is, we 
do not believe that many debtors use the secured credit system itself to 
bond themselves against the issuance of secured debt. The reason may be 
that debtors do not desire such a bond, but it may be instead that the 
current technology of creditor protection has not created an environment in 
which such a bond can develop. Our proposal could usefully alter the 
environment. 
CONCLUSION 
The irony of a debtor’s covenant against actions that can lead to its 
insolvency is that when such a covenant is breached, insolvency itself may 
render the remedy ineffective. For creditors to be protected by such covenants, 
 
102 See PICKER, supra note 101, at 237-41 (describing the superpriority of purchase money 
security interests under sections 9-103 and 9-324 of the UCC). 
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a solution is enforcement against third parties who may have benefited from 
such breach. Enforcement against third parties should be limited to cases 
where the third parties were on actual or constructive notice of a creditor’s 
right to enforcement against them. Under these circumstances, debtors 
would be forced to internalize more fully the costs of their breaches. This 
would induce relatively efficient debtor behavior ex post and allow a debtor 
effectively to promise such behavior ex ante.  
